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This article analyzes the appeal of populist radical right (PRR) politics in the US after the election of Donald Trump. Specif-
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Using an online survey of 1052 Arizona Republicans in the lead-up to the August 2018 Senate primary, I evaluate support
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1. Introduction
In 2016, Donald Trump shocked observers bywinning the
Republican nomination and the presidency. Trump, a po-
litically inexperienced real estate developer, reality tele-
vision star, and conservative commentator, was hardly
a favored candidate. He spewed anti-elite invectives,
rejected the Republican establishment, and challenged
Republican doctrine on issues like immigration and trade.
Trump’s unorthodox policies, charisma, and media pro-
file set him apart as a different breed of Republican. Party
loyalty, combined with an uninspiring Democratic alter-
native in Hillary Clinton, may help explain Trump’s gen-
eral election victory, but neither of these factors can
explain how he bested his Republican competitors to
win the party’s nomination. Nor can they explain the
success of Trump-like candidates in primaries around
the country.
Some answers may lie in Europe. Trump is not a tradi-
tional Republican, but he does share ideological predilec-
tions with European right-wing populists. While some
scholarship has explored the transatlantic right, compar-
isons between the US and Europe often underempha-
size the particularities of the US party system, and the
importance of radical right actors mobilizing through a
mainstream conservative party (Mudde, 2017, p. 51).
Scholars seeking to explain the American radical right’s
recent surge have not taken advantage of the insights
from across the Atlantic (Mudde, 2019, p. 97). This arti-
cle bridges these gaps while building on recent literature
on the social media’s role in American elections.
In the wake of Trump’s victory, pitched battles for
the Republican Party’s soul broke out in primaries across
the country. I argue that Trump and post-Trump candi-
dates represent an American incarnation of whatMudde
(2007) calls the “populist radical right” (PRR), which em-
phasizes populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in its
appeals. I explore party convergence as a necessary pre-
condition for PRR success, per Kitschelt and McGann
(1995, p. 17), and consider the role of newmedia in rela-
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tion to two hypotheses: (1) the PRR should be attractive
to voters who believe the major parties have converged;
and (2) PRR voters should be more likely to get their
news from social media sources. I test these hypothe-
ses using a survey of Arizona Republicans conducted be-
fore the 2018 Senate primary—the first electoral cycle
of the Trump era. I find that PRR voters are more likely
to perceive convergence between the mainstream party
establishments and to use social media for news, but
that this only holds for the candidate that emphasized
anti-establishment rhetoric. In Arizona, the most credi-
ble anti-immigrant voice wasmore likely to attract voters
concerned about the economic impact of immigration,
lending support to demand side theories of PRR success.
1.1. Defining the PRR
What do we mean by “populist radical right”? The “radi-
cal” label denotes hostility to elements of liberal democ-
racy, such as institutional pluralism and safeguards for
minority rights (Plattner, 2010, p. 84). Populists invoke
the “general will” and view politics as a conflict between
the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2007,
p. 23). Mudde’s (2007) term, PRR, which comprises ac-
tors that are populist, nativist, and authoritarian, accu-
rately describes the Trump and post-Trump political phe-
nomena in the US, and meets definitional requirements
of analytical utility and cross-contextual portability.
PRR appeals border on anti-liberal democratic: Both
American and European populists exhibit contempt for
the independent judiciary. Donald Trump has been crit-
icized for his attacks on a judge overseeing a lawsuit
against him, for pardoning former Maricopa County
Sheriff Joe Arpaio in a contempt of court case, and for the
2016 Republican platform, which called for the impeach-
ment of activist judges (Peabody, 2018, pp. 243–245).
In appealing to their own definition of “the people” as
opposed to liberal democratic institutions, these figures
are populist.
The PRR is nativist, advocating exclusionary nation-
alism. Trump’s racially-charged comments about immi-
grants, along with his “Muslim ban,” push him firmly
into nativist territory. European PRR parties have also
stoked anti-immigrant sentiment. According to Ellinas
(2010, p. 12), “[t]he glue that ties these parties together
is their shared understanding that the political should
be congruent with the national.” Finally, authoritarian
appeals—those that emphasize conformity, deference,
skepticism, and aggression in defense of those values—
further distinguish the PRR. Authoritarian candidacies
tend to focus on immigration, law and order, and the mil-
itary (Knuckey & Hassan, 2019, pp. 2–3).
1.2. Explanations for the Success of the PRR
Explanations for PRR success fall into two main cat-
egories: supply side and demand side (Golder, 2016,
p. 482). Demand siders suggest that so-called “losers
of modernization,” voters who feel left behind by glob-
alization and the postindustrial economy, may find the
PRR appealing (Betz, 1993; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995,
pp. 56, 275). The PRR’s electorate is less-educated, more
likely to be unemployed, and more likely to work in
blue collar occupations (Imerzeel & Pickup, 2015, p. 358).
Macroeconomic factors are also important. Voters who
are economically anxious and fear immigrant labor com-
petition have reason to vote for the PRR. Jackman and
Volpert (1996, pp. 516–517) highlight unemployment as
a key explanatory variable, providing “the pretext for
mounting the xenophobic political appeals that charac-
terize these political movements.” Overall, however, sup-
port for unemployment as an explanatory variable is
mixed (Coffé, Heyndels, & Vermier, 2007, p. 144; Golder,
2016, p. 484; Knigge, 1998, p. 266; Lubbers & Scheepers,
2001, p. 443).
Cultural explanations, Golder’s third demand side
category, matter as well. These arguments hold that PRR
support can be explained by cultural change brought
about by mass immigration. To test this proposition,
scholars have compared PRR success to immigration lev-
els. Results are mixed (Coffé et al., 2007, p. 149; Golder,
2016, p. 485). Lubbers and Scheepers (2001, p. 443)
find that extreme right support increased in Germany
in regions where more asylum seekers settled, while
Knigge (1998, p. 70) finds that “heightened levels of im-
migration…are conducive to the electoral success of ex-
treme right-wing parties.” Mudde (2007, pp. 212–216)
provides a good overview of the literature. Other schol-
ars offer versions of the cultural backlash thesis, argu-
ing that the radical right succeeds where voters push
back against concessions for minorities (Bustikova, 2014,
pp. 1757–1758), or where intergenerational transitions
in values create a cultural backlash among older voters
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
Supply side explanations for PRR success have be-
come more common in recent years, as demand side
explanations have consistently failed to explain results
across different countries (Golder, 2016, p. 486). Supply
siders hold that the key to a PRR party’s success lies
within the party itself. Explanatory factors include ad-
ministrative competence and party organization (DeClair,
1999, p. 189; Ellinas, 2013, p. 561), leadership charisma
(Art, 2011, p. 8), and favorable opportunity structures, in-
cluding effective number of parties (Jackman & Volpert,
1996) and convergence of left and right parties (Kitschelt
& McGann, 1995, pp. 58, 72).
Ideology is another factor: Scholars have evaluated
the extent to which policy programs appeal to PRR vot-
ers. The most famous of these explanations is the “win-
ning formula” (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995), which holds
essentially that PRR parties succeed when they combine
authoritarian appeals with neoliberal economics (see
also de Lange, 2007, pp. 429–430). Muis and Scholte
(2013, p. 42) invoke ideological flexibility—that is, a shift
to the economic left—in explaining the Dutch Party for
Freedom’s spike in electoral success. Harteveld (2016,
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p. 226) analyzed ten radical right parties, and found that
a shift to the economic left attracts more working-class
votes at the expense of the highly-educated and highly-
skilled—demonstrating that economic policy programs
do explain at least some party appeal.
Other supply side explanations focus on the me-
dia’s role in facilitating PRR success (Boomgaarden &
Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 413; Ellinas, 2010). The PRR and the
media have a symbiotic relationship: controversial pol-
icy positions help media outlets generate compelling con-
tent, whilemedia attention helps the PRR build credibility
with voters (Golder, 2016, p. 488). As themedia landscape
changes, new media, including Internet-based social me-
dia, has factored into analyses of PRR success. Stockemer
and Barisione (2017, p. 111) find that social media ac-
tivism contributed in part to gains the French National
Front saw in the early 2010s, while Karl (2017, p. 353),
draws a similar conclusion about Hungary’s Jobbik.
This review provides a list of variables to be con-
sidered as part of an explanation for PRR success in
the US. It remains necessary, however, to consider how
insights drawn from the European literature apply in
the American context. Arguably, the most important dif-
ferences rest in the respective party systems. In the
US, the Republicans and Democrats dominate political
competition. Representatives of the PRR must compete
against fellow right-leaning candidates in Republican pri-
maries. Consequently, in the US, intra-party competition
is the crucial battleground for the PRR, unlike in much of
Europe, where proportional electoral systems facilitate
diverse party systems.
Literature on the radical right in the US has ne-
glected Republican intra-party competition andmobiliza-
tion (Mudde, 2017, p. 51). In intra-party competitions,
the key actors are individual candidates who only have
the relatively short primary campaign to declare, articu-
late, and defend their ideological programs against criti-
cism from fellow conservatives. Ideological positions are
still important—libertarians, religious conservatives, and
neoconservatives all compete in primaries—but differen-
tiation can come down to effective messaging. In a fast-
paced primary campaign where voters cannot rely on
party cues (all candidates compete for the same party’s
nomination) and candidates may not have much name
recognition (particularly in primaries for lower offices),
the role of the media and information about candidates
becomes especially important, as scholars have articu-
lated in reference to the European example.
Of special importance is the relationship between
social media and support for the PRR. While this lit-
erature is relatively underdeveloped in the European
context, the details of the 2016 election have inspired
some American literature. For example, Gunn (2017, p.
59) claims that “without Twitter or an equivalent social
media platform, it would have been difficult for a can-
didate like Trump…to come across as viable.” Groshek
and Koc-Michalska (2017, p. 1402) find that social media
were a critical part of Trump’s 2016 victory, along with
several other factors (including “television reliance” and
“passive and uncivil social media users”). New media—
particularly socialmedia—offers an appealing avenue for
populist candidates to circumvent the media establish-
ment (a frequent target of populist ire) and reach vot-
ers directly (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2013, p. 1597). It
therefore stands to reason that those who turn to these
newmedia sources should be more likely to support PRR
candidates in primaries.
Golder’s (2016, p. 490) invocation that future re-
search should be at the intersection of supply and de-
mand is apt, as both schools of thought are critical to
explaining PRR success. The key point of intersection is
with the source of information available to voters: the
media—particularly in the form of new media that offer
populists a direct route to their voters.
1.3. New Media, Party Convergence, and the PRR Vote
The explanatory factors highlighted abovehaveone thing
in common: none is complete without understanding
how voters see the world. Voters are not always well-
equipped to evaluate the nature or extent of phenom-
ena cited by the PRR. As Norris and Inglehart (2019,
p. 181) point out, “[t]he public may misperceive the ex-
tent of ethnic diversity, and of the crime rates and unem-
ployment.” If voters are rational actors whose political
choices are based on how they perceive events, media
diets matter.
In both Europe and the US, certain media outlets
have had a special relationship with PRR figures. Ellinas
(2010, pp. 8, 34) finds that the European far right’s suc-
cess is largely a function of media exposure. Such expo-
sure is the product of a symbiotic relationship:
The political repertoire of the Far Right satisfies the
thirst of the media for sensational, simplified, per-
sonalized, and controversial stories. Exaggerated ref-
erences to violent crime and urban tension, which
are typical ingredients of Far Right appeals, match the
growing tendency of the media to dramatize news.
The “simplism” that also characterizes Far Right ap-
peals (Lipset andRaab, 1978) is in linewith amedia ap-
petite for monocausal explanations and for the deliv-
ery of easy solutions to complex phenomena. (Ellinas,
2010, p. 34)
In the US, changes in technology and the regulatory en-
vironment have facilitated the rise of reactionary outlets
that thrive on this “simplism” and controversy. Among
other qualities, these “outrage” outlets are reactive, en-
gaging, ideologically selective, and centered on person-
ality (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014, p. 14). Talk radio hosts
stoke controversy to generate audience engagement, Fox
News dominates cable, and right-wingwebsites flood the
Internet with dubiously factual attack pieces.
Of course, not all media are equal. The growth of the
competitive 24-hour news market in the 1990s, along
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with satellite radio and the Internet, changed the game
for outrage media. New media outlets are appropriate
venues for outrage content. These outlets make no—
or weak—claims to objectivity, and the Internet makes
newsmore accessible than ever. A blog run out of a base-
ment can draw millions of monthly visitors. The mode of
dissemination alsomatters. Newmedia, characterized by
its embrace of new technology, along with “plurality, ac-
cessibility, and participation,” (Fenton, 2010, p. 6), best
exemplified by social media, should bemore likely tomo-
bilize support for PRR candidates, for several reasons.
The first key reason is the combination of purity
testing and convergence rhetoric. According to Kitschelt
and McGann (1995, pp. 17–25), convergence between
the mainstream right and the mainstream left is a
necessary condition for the radical right’s success in
Europe. In promoting themselves as an alternative to
the mainstream left and right, the PRR often con-
flates them. As anti-establishment brands, PRR can-
didates are well-positioned to take advantage of dis-
affection with establishment parties. In Europe, dis-
tinct parties emerge. In the US, where the majoritar-
ian political system freezes out third parties, I suggest
that this competition should instead be found within
Republican primaries. Instead of fringe parties accusing
mainstream parties of collusion, American PRR candi-
dates accuse mainstream Republicans of being insuffi-
ciently Republican, and attack the party establishment
itself, as Donald Trump did in 2016. The conservative me-
dia indulges such controversy, and moderate members
of the party caucus—those “insufficiently conservative”
Republicans—can expect to be attacked as “Republicans
in Name Only” (RINOs; Goldberg, 2013, p. 10). This leads
to a first hypothesis:
H1: If a conservative voter believes that the main-
stream liberal and conservative parties have “con-
verged,” that is, adopted similar positions on impor-
tant issues, he or she is more likely to support a
PRR candidate.
Leading up to 2016, making a case for party convergence
would have been difficult. Polls have indicated that over
time Americans have becomemore inclined to differenti-
ate the parties (Lee, 2016, p. 140). The question, then, is
how do voters come to believe that supporting an estab-
lishment Republican is essentially the same as support-
ing a Democrat?
I suggest that the answer aligns with the second rea-
son that new media and the PRR are synergistic: The
PRR’s claims and proposed solutions are eye-catching,
and are likely to be treated skeptically by themainstream
press. Exaggerations about crime, along with unconstitu-
tional or poorly articulated policy proposals, may draw
ridicule from trained journalists. But the same is not nec-
essarily true of new media. Whereas legacy media have
standards intended to prevent journalists from report-
ing misleading stories, social media feeds and partisan
blogs are not beholden to traditional editorial standards.
Once a story is released, editors have no control over the
commentary readers attach as they share it with their
personal networks, and those networks’ insularity mag-
nifies the message and shields audiences from rebuttal
(Jamieson & Capella, 2008, p. 76).
The melding of outrage media with social media pro-
vides a powerful platform for the PRR. Social media can
support upstart candidacies because it allows ideas to
permeate networks uncritically. Social media is also con-
ducive to purity testing, in which we would expect PRR
politicians to have a distinct advantage, given that most
PRR candidates have never held elected office and so
have never had to compromise. It therefore stands to
reason that exposure to the sort of information that is
likely to propagate in a social media environment rein-
forces support for PRR politicians among ideologically
susceptible conservatives. In their discussion of the 2016
presidential election, Groshek and Koc-Michalska (2017,
p. 1402) find that “loosening of gatekeeping certainly
opened the doors to a mediated information environ-
ment that while diverse and expansive was also hostile
and prone to misinformation that may well have rein-
forced citizens’ pre-existing viewpoints.” I therefore hy-
pothesize that social media use should be related to sup-
port for the PRR:
H2: If a conservative voter is exposed to social me-
dia news, he or she is more likely to support a PRR
candidate.
Because the theory outlined here should apply to the
PRR beyond the presidency, I employ a state-level case
study to evaluate these hypotheses.
2. Case Study: The Arizona US Senate Primary, 2018
After Donald Trump’s 2016 victory, Republicanism be-
came a contested concept. Trump’s irreverent use of so-
cial media, his attacks on the establishment, and his em-
brace byAmerican conservatism’s Internet fringe created
a new playbook for the fresh crop of PRR candidates
who began competing in Republican primaries around
the country.
The next round of primaries for federal office took
place in summer 2018. While the general election de-
cides who goes to Washington, the battle between con-
servative factions takes place at the primary stage. In the
American majoritarian system, once the parties have se-
lected candidates, voters essentially have a choice be-
tween the Republican and the Democrat, and many will
default to their party’s candidate out of loyalty, or as
a strategic vote against the opposition (Mudde, 2017,
p. 76). The primary is therefore a better venue for analy-
sis of the PRR.
A suitable primary meets several conditions. First, it
is for federal office, since many of the issues the PRR
emphasizes are federal responsibilities. Second, there
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should be clear competition between the PRR and the
Republican establishment. Third, it should have no in-
cumbent, in order to better isolate the impact of explana-
tory variables on a PRR candidacy. Finally, a Senate elec-
tion is preferable, because states cannot be gerryman-
dered, and because states are often larger and more di-
verse than districts.
2.1. Background and Candidates
On August 28, 2018, Arizona Republicans selected their
nominee for the Senate seat vacated by Jeff Flake. Flake
was a moderate Republican who decided to leave on
account of what he saw as the erosion of traditional
Republican values in the Trumpera. Flake’swithdrawal sig-
naled that the party’s radical wing had made his modera-
tion politically untenable. In stepping down, Flake created
a vacuum. Threemajor candidates contested the primary.
2.1.1. Martha McSally: The Establishment Candidate
Martha McSally is a military veteran elected to Congress
in 2015. In her early career, McSally’s views were mod-
erate: She supported pro-life positions on abortion, tra-
ditional marriage, and immigration reform with a path
to legalization (Parker, 2014). Dubbed by Politico “the
House GOP’s top recruit,”McSally also supported a bipar-
tisan equal pay bill and refused to endorse Tea Party prin-
ciples (Isenstadt, 2014).McSally’s candidacy represented
progress for the establishment GOP, and their female re-
cruitment project cited her primary victory as a success
(Henderson & Kucinich, 2014).
In the Trump era, McSally has been forced to balance
criticism of the party’s leaderwithmaintaining the base’s
support. When Trump attacked McCain for being cap-
tured in Vietnam, McSally was the only member of the
Arizona delegation to speak out (Nowicki, 2015). Even
after Trump secured the nomination, McSally declined
to endorse him (Hansen, 2016). Of course, Trump won
Arizona, and has remained popular with Republicans.
McSally made overtures to Trump’s base throughout the
2018 campaign, highlighting her interactions with the
President and hinting at the existence of a working rela-
tionship (Wingett Sanchez, 2018). Despite these efforts,
McSally did not credibly represent the PRR in 2018, and
was instead a target of convergence rhetoric from her
opponents in the primary (Sullivan, 2018). McSally also
ran a much more traditional campaign: Even after her
appointment to the Senate, she still has fewer “likes” on
Facebook and followers on Twitter than Ward or Arpaio,
and she attracted far more establishment support.
2.1.2. Joe Arpaio: The Anti-Immigrant Crusader
Before his Senate campaign, Joe Arpaio served as
Republican elected Sheriff of Maricopa County from
1993 until 2017, where he became notorious for hous-
ing prisoners in tents, reinstituting chain gangs, and cut-
ting meal costs (Arpaio & Sherman, 2008, pp. 96–97,
213). He also aggressively pursued an anti-illegal immi-
gration agenda.
As Sheriff, Arpaio denounced the dangers of illegal
immigration from Mexico. He called for a “war” on ille-
gal immigration, citing threats to culture and sovereignty.
He asks his readers, “[a]re we prepared to give up our
sovereignty? Are we willing to give up our national iden-
tity?” (Arpaio & Sherman, 2008, p. 244). Though he of-
ten frames it as law enforcement, Arpaio is making a
nativist cultural argument familiar to observers of the
European right.
Arpaio’s office consistently violated Latino citizens’
civil rights by illegally detaining them as part of its war on
illegal immigration.When a judge issued an injunction to
halt this practice, Arpaio ignored it, and was convicted of
criminal contempt (Pérez-Peña, 2017). Trump later par-
doned the Sheriff, leading Breitbart to run the headline,
“Trump Defends Arpaio Pardon as GOP Establishment
Joins the Left” (Mason, 2017). These events highlight
fault lines in the post-Trump conservative movement,
and place Arpaio in the anti-establishment camp.
For Arpaio, the 2018 campaign proceeded famil-
iarly. On his signature issue he supported hardline poli-
cies, suggesting that foreigners brought to the coun-
try illegally as children should be deported, and that
the military should be deployed to Mexico to combat
drug smuggling (Romero, 2018). In line with the conver-
gence theme, Arpaio said of McSally, “she sounds like a
Democrat” (Sullivan, 2018). When it came to the party’s
right fringe, however, Arpaio had competition.
2.1.3. Kelli Ward: The Outsider
Kelli Ward burst onto the national stage in 2016 with
an unsuccessful primary challenge against John McCain.
Shortly after her defeat, she announced that she would
challenge Flake. Ward, a former state legislator, became
a PRR darling for her anti-establishment politics. By 2018,
Ward had established herself as “the perfect spokesper-
son for the Trumpwing of the GOP” (Posner, 2017).Ward
also received endorsements from radical right figures.
Representative Paul Gosar, known for his radical posi-
tions and relationship with the European right, called
McSally an “establishment patsy,” and endorsed Ward
(Garcia, 2018), as did Sebastien Gorka, a former Trump
deputy with European far right ties (Farzan, 2018).
This contest attracted the Republican establishment.
The Senate Majority Leader’s allies poured money into
the race, bolstering McSally as an immigration hardliner,
and drawing fire from the Ward campaign, which at-
tacked McSally’s record on Trump, the border wall, and
“dozens of votes for amnesty” (Arkin, 2018). Combat be-
tween the Republican establishment and the PRR flared
throughout the summer. Ward attacked McSally’s con-
servatism and attempted to tie her to the left, by alleging
that McSally had voted for amnesty “11 times” in a mis-
leading radio ad (Athey, 2018). Ward immersed herself
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in anti-establishment convergence rhetoric, and in a fur-
ther step away from the establishment, she attempted
to leverage the conservative Internet media ecosystem.
Ward campaigned with far right Internet personal-
ity Mike Cernovich, whom The Washington Post called,
“[her] newly minted campaign surrogate” (Selk, 2018).
Breitbart editor and Trump strategist Steve Bannon par-
ticipated inWard’s campaign launch (Nowicki, 2017), and
until September 2017, several senior campaign aides
were former Breitbart reporters (Moore, 2017). These
Breitbart connections are especially important in eval-
uating the theory presented here, as Faris et al. (2017,
pp. 11–13) find that Breitbart formed “the nexus of con-
servative media” in 2015–2016, and was the most pop-
ular source for social media sharing on the right during
the 2016 election. Ward was also among a group of in-
surgent Republicans who benefited from websites mas-
querading as legitimate news sites that produced anti-
establishment content and endorsed candidates under
the guise of independent journalism (Schwartz, 2018).
3. Methodology
The research question posed here is “Does use of social
media for news drive support for the PRR in Republican
primaries?” To test the hypotheses that perceptions of
convergence and use of social media drive support for
PRR candidates, I employed Qualtrics to distribute an on-
line survey to 1052 self-identified Arizona Republicans
in the week leading up to the primary in August 2018.
Qualtrics (2014, p. 4) offers the following disclaimer:
“Qualtrics panel partners randomly select respondents
for surveys where respondents are highly likely to qual-
ify….Each sample from the panel base is proportioned to
the general population and then randomized before the
survey is deployed.”
3.1. Variables
To capture attitudes about immigration, I used several
American National Election Survey (ANES) measures, in-
cluding one that asks how worried respondents are
about illegal immigration, and one that asks if immi-
grants are “generally good for America’s economy.” To
capture economic anxiety, I asked voters how worried
they were about employment status using another ANES
measure. To measure authoritarian values, I included
four standard ANES child-rearing questions and created
an index (see also MacWilliams, 2016). To test conver-
gence, I asked voters if there were any important dif-
ferences between the Republican establishment and the
Democratic Party. I also asked about perceptions of cor-
ruption and concern about RINOs to gauge disaffection
with the party. To measure exposure to social media,
I asked voters where they get their news.
The dependent variable (DV) is the answer to the
question “if the 2018 Arizona Republican Senate Primary
election were held today, which of the candidates would
you vote for?” Support for each candidate is the DV for
each model reported in Table 1.
3.2. Method
I use logistic regression because the DV is dichotomous.
Logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret
because they represent log odds, so I have reported the
results as odds ratios (ORs). TheOR “describes howmuch
more likely an outcome is to occur in one group as com-
pared to another group” (Braver, Tboemmes, & Moser,
2010, p. 957), representing the relative odds of two re-
lated outcomes occurring. For example, in Table 1, the
OR for the variable “Race (white)” in the McSally model
is the odds that a McSally supporter is white divided by
the odds that he/she is not. This OR is less than one, in-
dicating that a McSally supporter is 0.75 times as likely
as a non-McSally voter to be white (though this is not
significant). For ordinal independent variables, the OR
increases or decreases exponentially, so for each addi-
tional year of age, a voter is 1.02 times as likely to vote
for McSally (Braver et al., 2010, p. 958).
4. Results
The results, displayed below in Table 1, largely support
the hypotheses proposed above. H1 holds that PRR vot-
ers should be more likely to perceive convergence be-
tween the parties, and this is the case. As expected,
McSally voters are less likely to perceive corruption to be
widespread, and while the other two variables of inter-
est (party similarity and RINOs are a detriment) are not
significant, they are directionally correct. Ward’s voters
are nearly twice as likely to agree that there are no dif-
ferences between the Republican establishment and the
Democratic Party, and they are substantially more likely
to agree that RINOs are a detriment to the Republican
Party. H1 does little to explain Arpaio support, however.
H2 holds that PRR voters should be more likely to
get their news from social media sources. The data sup-
port H2 in the McSally and Ward cases. McSally’s sup-
porters are roughly half as likely to use social media for
news, and nearly twice as likely to turn to Fox News.
Ward’s supporters are more likely to turn to social me-
dia for news, as expected, while Arpaio’s supporters are
less likely to watch Fox or listen to talk radio. Neither
fear of job loss nor authoritarian attitudes are significant,
though Arpaio’s supporters are substantially more likely
to perceive immigrants as bad for the economy, as would
be expected according to economic demand side theo-
ries. Finally, McSally’s supporters are slightly older and
Ward’s slightly younger, while Arpaio’s supporters have
lower levels of education and are less conservative.
5. Analysis
H1 predicts that PRR voters should be likely to perceive
convergence between the parties. This is borne out in
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Table 1. Factors that influence support for 2018 Arizona Senate candidates among self-identified Republican likely voters.
Independent variable McSally support Ward support Arpaio support
No differences between Rep./Dem. establishment 0.76 1.79 * 0.96
Perception of corruption (1–4) 0.77 * 1.26 1.10
RINOs are a detriment (1–5 [strongly agree]) 0.89 1.41 *** 0.91
Social media news consumer 0.60 ** 1.79 * 1.24
Talk radio news consumer 1.12 1.16 0.59 *
Fox News viewer 1.71 ** 0.79 0.63 *
Fear of job loss (1–5 [extremely worried]) 1.03 1.02 0.94
Authoritarianism (0–4) 1.00 0.95 1.19
Immigrants good for economy (1–5 [strongly disagree]) 0.84 * 0.93 1.46 ***
Education (1–5 [highest]) 1.10 1.13 0.74 **
Income (1–5 [highest]) 1.11 1.04 0.81
Age (years) 1.02 ** 0.98 * 0.98
Ideology (1 [extremely liberal]–7 [extremely conservative]) 1.05 1.21 0.83 *
Race (white) 0.75 2.29 0.75
Constant 1.24 0.01 *** 3.67
n count 739 739 739
Pseudo r-squared 0.07 0.07 0.11
Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Ward’s case, but not in Arpaio’s case. Voters who be-
lieve that establishment Republicans and the Democratic
Party are indistinguishable are nearly twice as likely to
support Ward. It appears that efforts to paint McSally
as an establishment patsy were successful, but that anti-
establishment voters do not view Arpaio, an experienced
politician, as a suitable outlet for their disaffection. The
fact that Ward’s voters are also more likely to identify
“fake” Republicans (“RINOs”) as a detriment indicates
that, for many Republicans, mainstream offerings are
impure. McSally’s voters, perhaps tired of their candi-
date drawing criticism as insufficiently Republican, do
not perceive RINOs to be a threat. Corruption percep-
tions among likely voters tell an interesting story as well.
Populists, including Trump, paint the world as full of cor-
ruption. They pledge to “drain the swamp” andmake gov-
ernment work for the people again, claiming that both
parties have contributed to the status quo. I therefore
expect that PRR supporters should believe corruption to
be more problematic. Although this variable is not sig-
nificant in either the Ward or Arpaio models, McSally’s
voters are less likely to perceive corruption—providing
some corroboration for the hypothesis.
The supply side literature suggests that the PRR suc-
ceeds where convergence between mainstream parties
creates a favorable opportunity structure (Kitschelt &
McGann, 1995, p. 17). The analysis here indicates that
voters who believe in party convergence do, in fact, dis-
proportionately support Ward, a PRR candidate. This
finding provides evidence that a supply side explana-
tion derived theoretically from European party systems
and patterns of communication (convergence rhetoric)
can travel to American party primaries, where a first-
past-the-post electoral systemmakesmulti-party compe-
tition untenable.
There are, however, some caveats that limit the
scope of this finding. While convergence explanations
are typically applied at the party system level (e.g., Katz
& Mair, 2009), here I operationalize convergence at the
level of individual perception. I have done so for two rea-
sons. First, the DV examined is support for individual can-
didates, not organized parties. Even the most ephemeral
parties typically outlast individual candidacies. Second,
voters’ perceptions may not align with reality. I do not
claim here that actual party convergence explains PRR
success, but rather that when a voter believes that the
parties have converged, the PRR becomes a rational se-
lection. The best way to operationalize perception is at
the individual level.
Endogeneity limits my ability to make causal infer-
ences about convergence. It is not possible to determine
if anti-establishment attitudes caused Ward support or
vice versa based on this cross-sectional analysis. That
said, the fact that those Republican primary voters that
support a PRR candidate also believe that the Republican
establishment is indistinguishable from the Democrats
sheds light on how the PRR can successfully mobilize
within an existing conservative party.
The second part of the story concerns the reason for
these beliefs. H2 holds that PRR voters should be more
likely to get their news from social media, at least in
part because social media offer an environment for vot-
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ers to consume and share belief-affirming information.
H2 is also borne out in the Ward case, but, again, not
for Arpaio. While McSally supporters are more likely to
watch Fox News, Ward supporters are nearly twice as
likely to use social media for news. This suggests that
the characteristics of social media news are appealing to
PRR voters, and may therefore benefit PRR candidacies.
In line with previous research (Groshek & Koc-Michalska,
2017), consumption of social media news does appear to
correlate with support for populists in primaries. Ward’s
willingness to embrace new media, conspiracy theo-
ries, convergence rhetoric/purity testing, and outlandish
claims drew criticism from themainstream press, but en-
dearedher to the Internet fringe,whodisproportionately
turned out for her in the primary at Arpaio’s expense.
Surprisingly, neither Fox nor talk radio boost sup-
port for either PRR candidate, perhaps because Trump
did not endorse any candidate after Flake dropped out,
or because national conservative hosts were less likely
to cover a state’s primary competition. It is also pos-
sible that, although conservative outlets like Fox and
major talk radio hosts (e.g., Rush Limbaugh and Sean
Hannity) often position themselves as counterweights to
the liberal establishment, committed anti-establishment
primary voters may consider those outlets part of the
establishment themselves. If anti-establishment voters
consider traditional conservative media to be part of the
establishment, social media would be even more attrac-
tive for these voters—especially in light of characteris-
tics such as the ability for candidates to speak directly
to voters on platforms like Twitter and Facebook, the
“loosening of gatekeeping” (Groshek & Koc-Michalska,
2017, p. 1402), and the potential for stories to spread
quickly without any official endorsement. Social media’s
grassroots, viral nature is especially appealing to the
PRR. While this cross-sectional analysis cannot establish
causality, the evidence presented strongly suggests that
when voters are exposed to the (relatively) gatekeeper-
free world of social media news, PRR talking points be-
come more prominent and more compelling.
5.1. Sheriff Joe and the PRR
Arpaio’s voters have less in common with Ward’s vot-
ers than expected. While both groups trend younger,
Arpaio’s voters appear to be driven by concerns about
immigration. In Europe, PRR parties often appeal to
both anti-establishment and anti-immigration voters.
The Arizona Senate primary included two candidates
vying for largely the same base, each appearing to at-
tract only part of it. Arpaio, because of his tenure as a
Republican official with a national profile built on crime
and immigration, is the natural choice for committed
Republicans who prioritize those issues. This would ex-
plain why Arpaio’s supporters are less likely to agree
that immigrants are good for the economy. The fact that
Arpaio’s supporters are also less educated offers a par-
tial explanation for the economic threat of immigration
they perceive, as expected by some of the demand side
literature (e.g., Jackman & Volpert, 1996).
Arpaio’s voters are less likely to identify as “very
conservative.”Moderate Republicanswho feel economic
pressure from immigration might find the scorched
earth, conspiratorial politics of the PRR appealing, but
prioritize effective immigration policy over “draining
the swamp.” It appears that Arpaio appealed to anti-
immigrant Republicans, while Ward attracted the anti-
establishment camp. The PRR coalition was split: Arpaio
successfully drew the nativists, while Ward appealed to
the populists.
It is unclear, however, how much of Arpaio’s suc-
cess is due to his outsized public profile. As a longtime
local politician with national name recognition, Arpaio
may have gained some of the advantages of incum-
bency without holding the desired office. For example,
his name recognition may have led the electorate to
perceive him as more viable (Kam & Zechmeister, 2013,
p. 983). However, I do not believe that Arpaio’s name
recognition is sufficient to explain the results for two
reasons. First, leading up to the primary, much of the
news coverage about Arpaio concerned either the par-
don he received from Trump or commentary on his “ir-
relevance” (Romero, 2018). Second, while name recogni-
tion is powerful in local elections contested by relative
unknowns, the 2018 Arizona Senate primary was a high-
profile race. All three candidates had claims to relevance.
Ward and Arpaio both drew Donald Trump’s attention
in 2016, and McSally served in Congress. The primary
received national media coverage, and the results had
potential to carry national implications (i.e., the Senate
may have flipped from Republican to Democratic con-
trol). Voter turnout was also record-breaking: More than
670,000 voters participated in the Republican primary
(Daniels, 2018).
6. Conclusion
This analysis offers evidence that theoretical expecta-
tions about party convergence and social media use
can explain some PRR success in the US. In Arizona,
among Republicans, Kelli Ward’s supporters are more
likely to see the Republican establishment as functionally
Democratic and to report accessing social media news.
Joe Arpaio’s supporters, on the other hand, do not share
these characteristics: They aremore likely to perceive im-
migration as economically disadvantageous, and to have
lower levels of education. These findings indicate that
the PRR coalition comprises both anti-immigrant and
anti-establishment supporters, and that the two groups
are not coterminous. The PRR encompassing two distinct
camps is consistent with the theory that populism is a
thin-centered ideology (or “toolkit,” or style) that is not
inherently tied to other left or right ideologies like na-
tivism (Mudde, 2007, p. 23; Ylä-Anttila, 2017, p. 8). The
results also support the supply side idea that there is
a symbiotic relationship between social media and the
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PRR. Though this evidence is not definitively causal, it
offers a compelling circumstantial case for social me-
dia’s power.
Furthermore, these results suggest that transitioning
from experienced party politician to insurgent is difficult,
and that while long experience in office may establish
credibility on issues, it is detrimental in attracting anti-
establishment support.
The theory presented here is drawn from European
literature on both the supply side and the demand side,
with a specific focus on the part convergence and new
media play in facilitating PRR success. The American
party system produces different constraints than many
of its European counterparts, forcing PRR competition
into the intra-party arena. Nevertheless, the evidence
demonstrates that, when properly contextualized, sim-
ilar phenomena facilitate support for the PRR on both
sides of the Atlantic.
Future research should expand the scope of the
analysis to include independents. Participants in the ex-
amined survey self-identified as Republicans, but non-
Republicans can and do vote in primaries. PRR candi-
dates like to position themselves as alternatives to left-
right politics. Self-identified independents could there-
fore have an important role to play in explaining PRR suc-
cess in the US. This is a promising area for future inquiry.
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